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BRAZIL: Partial Election Returns

With about 25 percent of the vote counted, opposition gubernatorial and senatorial candidates are winning in eight states, including major ones like Sao Paulo and Rio.

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The government is well ahead elsewhere and should retain a commanding majority of the 23 statehouses. No pattern is yet apparent for the lower congressional house or state legislative contests, which are crucial for the eventual makeup of the presidential electoral college.

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In Rio, leftist gubernatorial candidate Brizola is publicly charging the government with purposely slowing the vote count so that it can manipulate the results in its candidate's favor.

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Comment: The government would find it difficult to tamper with the results favoring Brizola. President Figueiredo has publicly promised to respect the voting results, particularly Brizola's expected victory.

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Any efforts of the security services to manipulate the vote probably would be ineffective. The votes are counted manually and in public, and Brizola's charges have focused even more attention on the contest in Rio.

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CHINA-LIBYA: Limited Cooperation

The itinerary for Premier Zhao Ziyang's trip through North Africa next month suggests that China wants to strengthen its position with the moderate Arab states to balance its recent efforts to improve ties with Libya. [redacted] 25X1

Zhao's tour, by avoiding Libya, will emphasize Beijing's unwillingness to add new momentum to the expanded economic and technical cooperation, joint investment, and trade that were agreed to during Libyan leader Qadhafi's visit to China last month. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Comment: Qadhafi's undiplomatic behavior while in Beijing, including his verbal attacks on Morocco's King Hassan and his criticism of the Fez peace plan, presumably embarrassed the Chinese. Zhao will want to assure his hosts in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco--all with longstanding ties to China--that Beijing is not leaning toward Libya and other radical states in the Middle East or abandoning its support for the approach adopted at Fez. [redacted] 25X1

Beijing's concern about the views of the moderate Arabs, however, will not stop it from courting Tripoli. As in their dealings with other states that are aligned with the USSR, the Chinese are trying to reduce Libya's reliance on Moscow and to persuade it that China is not closely aligned with the US. China cannot compete with the USSR as a military supplier for Libya, but Beijing probably hopes to use conventional arms sales, trade, and cautious political gestures to improve its leverage with the Libyans. [redacted] 25X1

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